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ABSTRACT
This study investigates how accounting quality impacts the
incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices. Using
data from 18 developed countries that apply IFRS, during the
period 2004–2015, we find strong evidence that supports the
hypothesis that accounting quality determines stock price inform-
ativeness. The results yield important policy implications because
stock prices are a valuable source of information for many users,
especially for the management of the listed companies. The study
reveals accounting quality’s direct influence over the stock price
informativeness, in the way that along with the improvement of
accounting quality also increases the amount of firm-specific
information embedded into stock prices.
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1. Introduction and motivation
The Global Financial Crisis and various corporate scandals (Enron, WorldCom,
Tyco) underline the relevance of international accounting and financial reporting
standards (IFRS), which help to prevent frauds and to avoid management mistakes
(Uyar, Gungormus, & Kuzey, 2017). Moreover, transparency is one of the core princi-
ples of good corporate governance, promoting the report of material facts in real
time to the stakeholders and by this contributing to more confidence in the manage-
ment. Concerning the financial aspects of a business, transparency can be maintained
using IFRS (WEF, GCR 2014–2015). That is why we choose to include in our sample
only countries that report accordingly to IFRS. Also, companies adopting IFRS have
less earnings management, more timely loss recognition and more value relevance of
earnings, all of which can be interpreted as evidence of higher accounting quality.
Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008) and Ball (2006) argue that a key benefit of IFRS
to investors is a better-quality accounting. In line with these facts, our paper
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examines the role that accounting quality has on the type of information that incor-
porates into stock prices across a sample of developed markets.
The final product of accounting is represented by the financial reports, and for
this reason, the accounting quality is considered in this paper interchangeable
with financial reporting quality. The non-existence of a generally accepted defin-
ition or measurement method for financial reporting quality encourages research-
ers to study, propose and validate in different contexts a variety of indicators.
We use four indicators of financial reporting quality which are found in The
Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) 2014–2015: the strength of auditing and report-
ing standards; the strength of investor protection; the efficacy of corporate boards
and the protection of minority shareholders’ interests. Recently, papers such as
Boolaky (2012), Boolaky and Cooper (2015) and Nurunnabi (2017) have used these
indicators. The GCR 2014–2015 issued by the World Economic Forum provides a
comparative qualitative picture of the economic and business environments of 144
individual countries. The report measures a great variety of indicators grouped in 12
pillars which form the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI). The survey questions are
assessed on a 7-point Likert scale, where 1 is the lowest possible and 7 the highest
possible. Moreover, these four variables compound the aggregate indicator named
Accountability which was also used as a proxy for accounting quality.
Information about fundamentals of a firm is capitalised into stock prices in two
ways: through a general revaluation of stock values following the release of public
information and through the trading activity of risk arbitrageurs who gather and pos-
sess private information (Durnev, Morck, Yeung, & Zarowin, 2003). Research shows
that financial markets impact the real economy through the information that real-
decision makers learn from stock prices and use it to guide their decisions and
actions (Bond, Edmans, & Goldstein, 2012). The real-decision makers in case of com-
panies are the management teams. Managers can learn from market prices because
even if they are the most informed agents about a specific firm, they can still miss
some information which could be in possession of outsiders. That is why, stock price
informativeness is of high interest for the management. In our study, we have used
the most popular measures of stock price informativeness: stock price synchronicity
and idiosyncratic volatility. The reason for using both measures is that stock price
synchronicity and idiosyncratic volatility are not equivalent in measuring the incorp-
oration of firm-specific information into the stock prices. As Li, Rajgopal, and
Venkatachalam (2014) demonstrate, these measures may lead to contradictory infer-
ences, especially if there is a correlation between the systematic risk and the variable
of interest (e.g., earning quality or governance quality). Therefore, stock price syn-
chronicity and idiosyncratic volatility should not be viewed as interchange-
able measures.
Our findings exhibit a negative connection between accounting quality and stock
price synchronicity. Also, our results show that accounting quality is positively corre-
lated to idiosyncratic volatility. These are consistent with Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000)
and Cheong and Zurbruegg (2016). Morck et al. (2000) show that among developed
stock markets, higher firm-specific returns variation is associated with stronger public
investor property rights and accounting standards are negatively correlated with
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synchronicity. Cheong and Zurbruegg (2016) find that less firm-level information
reaches the market if the enforcement of the accounting standards is weak.
This study contributes to the literature by using a set of markets that have adopted
the same disclosure rules and it highlights the importance of the compliance and
enforcement of regime. Also, our paper fills the gap regarding the connection
between accounting quality and stock price informativeness in the case of IFRS
adopters in the recent years.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 offers a view of the
current state of the literature regarding the analysed subject. Section 3 describes the
data and the methodology of research. The results are provided in Section 4 and
Section 5 contains concluding remarks and observations on possible future research.
2. Literature review
2.1. Country-level determinants of accounting quality
Recent empirical work shows that country-level accounting quality is relevant to users
of financial information. The increased trend in the globalisation of business and
financial markets demands higher-quality financial information produced under
strong auditing and reporting standards (Boolaky, Krishnamurti, & Hogue, 2013).
Several studies have examined the impact of firm-level factors upon the quality of
accounting information. Anyway, the research in this field states that country-level
factors are much more significant in explaining cross-country variations in earnings
quality (Davis-Friday, 2010).
Chen, Tang, Jiang, and Lin (2010) examine the relationship between accounting
quality and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Europe and suggest
that accounting standards play a role in improving the quality of reporting. The IFRS
standards are a set of high-quality accounting standards which aim to improve the
financial reporting quality for the adopters and enhance the quality of public disclos-
ure. They are expected to give significant benefits to the capital market, which in
turn, to allow more firm-specific information to incorporate into stock prices. If regu-
lations are weak, firms may choose not to disclose information or to manipulate it
(Boolaky, Krishnamurti, & Hogue, 2013). More than 140 countries currently permit
or require IFRS. Since the announcement of IFRS adoption, national accounting dif-
ferences have decreased, and the present international accounting setting provides an
opportunity to examine why there are differences in earnings quality (Houqe, van
Zijl, Dunstan, & Karim, 2012).
Research suggests that the IFRS standards improve the comparability of firms
across markets, increase the efficiency of capital allocation (Armstrong, Barth,
Jagolinzer, & Riedl, 2010; Covrig, Defond, & Hung, 2007), provide greater disclosure
and enhance transparency (Barth et al., 2008; Daske, Hail, Leuz, & Verdi, 2008).
Boolaky et al. (2013) view the strength of auditing and reporting standards as an inte-
gral component of institutional transparency that is relevant for businesses, investors
and governments. Good accounting and audit regulations improve transparency
through better disclosure of information and easier cross-firm comparisons.
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Investors typically obtain certain rights or powers that are protected by the
enforcement of regulations and laws. For example, disclosure and accounting rules
provide investors with the information they need to exercise their rights (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). Houqe et al. (2012) notice that strong
investor protection, strong legal enforcement and a common law legal system are fun-
damental determinants of high-quality financial statement numbers. There is an
exhaustive research that sustains these ideas (Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000; Ball,
Robin, & Wu, 2003; Daske, Hail, Leuz, & Verdi, 2008; Francis & Wang, 2008; La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997, 1998, La Porta et al., 2000; Leuz,
Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003).
Investor protection encourages the development of financial markets. La Porta
et al. (1997) argue that countries that protect shareholders have more valuable stock
markets, larger numbers of listed securities per capita, and a higher rate of initial
public offering (IPO) activity than do have the unprotective countries.
Greater financial disclosure, higher-quality earnings, and greater information dissem-
ination are associated with more informative stock prices. Additional tests indicate that
on average stock price informativeness is greater in countries with strong investor pro-
tection (Haw, Hu, Lee, & Wu, 2012). Durnev et al. (2003) believe that more inform-
ative stock prices lead to efficient allocation of capital because they reflect greater firm-
specific information and capture more closely the firm’s fundamental value.
Regarding the relationship between investor protection and accounting quality,
Houqe et al. (2012) demonstrate that earnings quality increases for mandatory IFRS
adoption when a country’s investor protection regime provides stronger protection.
Improvement of accounting quality depends on at least two factors: high-quality
accounting standards and a country’s overall investor protection (Soderstrom & Sun,
2007). Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) examine the relationship between investor
protection and earnings management across 31 countries and they found that strong
investor protection at the country level reduces earnings management practices and
thus leads to higher accounting quality. There is research (Bhattacharya, Daouk, &
Welker, 2003; Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004) which states that in countries with
strong investor protection regimes there are greater financial transparency and less
earnings management, these countries having higher accounting quality. Ball et al.
(2003) argue that adopting high-quality accounting standards is a necessary condition
for acquiring high-quality information, without being a sufficient one without a
proper country-level investor protection.
The importance of corporate boards has been viewed as a key element in monitor-
ing the actions of management and serving the interests of shareholders (Doirye,
2012). The level of board effectiveness and efficacy in scrutinising managers depend
on the size and composition of the board. Doirye (2012) considers that corporate
boards are more effective when outsiders dominate. Cheng and Courtenay (2006)
suggest that board efficacy increases the level of voluntary disclosure.
Protection of minority shareholders’ interests measures the strength of minority
shareholders protections against misuse of corporate assets by directors for their per-
sonal gain, as well as shareholders rights, governance safeguards and corporate trans-
parency requirements that reduce the risk of abuse. Investor protection matter for the
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ability of companies to raise the capital needed to grow, innovate, diversify and com-
pete. Economies that have dynamic capital markets tend to effectively protect invest-
ors. In these economies, investors receive the financial information they can trust,
they participate in major decisions of the companies, and directors are accountable
for their managerial decisions (Dahya, Dimitrov, & McConnell, 2008).
2.2. Stock price informativeness and accounting data
Price efficiency is defined as the extent to which market prices are informative about
the value of traded assets. Stock price informativeness shows the amount of informa-
tion about future earnings that is capitalised into the price (Durnev et al., 2003). A
popular measure to distinguish between the amount of firm-specific and market-wide
information that is impounded into stock prices can be found in the paper of Roll
(1988), who uses the R2 from a market model regression as an indicator of stock
return synchronicity. A low R2 indicates that more firm-specific information is
impounded into the stock price and thus the stock price is more informative (Todea
& Buglea, 2017). The higher the R2, the greater the stock is synchronous with general
market movements (Cheong & Zurbruegg, 2016). Stock returns reflect new market-
level and firm-level specific information. Roll (1988) makes clear that the extent to
which stocks move together depends on the relative amounts of firm-level and mar-
ket-level information capitalised into stock prices.
Following the methodology elaborated by Roll (1988), Morck et al. (2000) find that
stock prices move together more in poor economies than in the richer ones and that
accounting standards are negatively correlated with synchronicity. They state that, if
accounting data is more useful, then more firm-specific information is available to all
investors. Consequently, we might observe more firm-specific price variation in coun-
tries with better accounting standards.
Further on, Durnev et al. (2003) find that greater firm-specific stock return variation
is associated with more informative stock prices, where stock price informativeness is
defined as how much information stock prices contain about future earnings. Using
stock returns from 40 stock markets from 1990 to 2001, Jin and Myers (2006) show
that the lack of transparency increases R2 by shifting firm-specific risk to managers.
They consider that imperfect protection of investors does not affect synchronicity if the
firm is entirely transparent, some degree of opaqueness being desirable. Others, like
Cheong and Zurbruegg (2016) analyse the role that audit quality has on the type of
information analysts impound into stock prices across a sample of developed and
emerging markets. They examine the amount of firm-specific information versus mar-
ket-wide information that incorporates into stock prices using stock return synchron-
icity. They conclude that irrespective of the disclosure regime in place, less firm-level
information reaches the market if the enforcement of the accounting standards is weak.
2.3. The real effects of the financial markets
Some researchers consider that one of the most important topics in financial econom-
ics is whether financial markets affect the real economy (Bond et al., 2012). They
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design their research starting from a few questions: ‘Is the stock-market just a side-
show or does it affect real economic activity? How can one explain the attention
devoted to secondary financial markets? Why do managers constantly track the per-
formance of their firms’ stocks? Why does the press so frequently report the develop-
ments in the stock-markets?’ They consider that treating secondary market prices as a
side-show is a mistake because real-decision makers learn new information from
these prices and use it to guide their real decisions. Also, Hayek (1945) argued that
prices are a useful source of information. Prices aggregate various pieces of informa-
tion which real-decision makers use in taking actions.
Moreover, decision makers can pay a lot of attention to market prices even if they
do not learn from these when they are party to contracts that are contingent on stock
prices. Another possibility, preferred by proponents of behavioural finance, is that
secondary-market prices have a real effect on economic activity because real-decision
makers irrationally follow the price and use it as an anchor (Bond et al., 2012).
According to Fama and Miller (1972), an efficient market ‘has a very desirable fea-
ture. In particular, at any point in time market prices of securities provide accurate sig-
nals for resource allocation; that is, firms can make production-investment decisions’.
Bond et al. (2012) consider that this idea is quite natural, because if prices are effi-
cient and aggregate information from various sources, then decision makers in the
real sector, who are likely to be only partially informed, will wish to learn from these
market prices.
3. Data and research methodology
3.1. Accounting quality
Following the paper aim, to capture the way through which accounting quality influ-
ences the incorporation of firm-specific information into the stock prices, the study
assesses the accounting quality by using the below four individual indicators an
aggregate indicator Accountability which is the equally weighted average of all the
four variables stated previously. All these variables are extracted from The Global
Competitiveness Report 2014–2015.
1. The strength of auditing and reporting standards (SARS) is computed using a survey
that asks the leading business executives from 144 countries the following question:
‘In your country, how strong are financial auditing and reporting standards?’ The
answer is based on a Likert scale, with one implying a negative answer to the ques-
tion, and seven a very positive one. SARS is a measure of financial reporting qual-
ity and auditing strength based on the perception of the business executives from
the selected countries. Also, SARS is a proxy for institutional transparency which is
expected to have a major bearing on the quality of financial information produced
by companies in each country (WEF, GCR 2009–2010).
2. The strength of investor protection variable is a combination of the Extent of
disclosure index (transparency of transactions), the Extent of director liability
index (liability for self-dealing), and the Ease of shareholder suit index (share-
holders’ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct).
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3. The efficacy of corporate boards is based on the answers provided by business
executives to the following question: ‘In your country, how would you character-
ise corporate governance by investors and boards of directors?’ The answer is
based on a Likert scale, with one implying management has little accountability
to investors and boards, and seven implying management is highly accountable
to investors and boards.
4. Protection of minority shareholders’ interests is computed starting from the ques-
tions: ‘In your country, to what extent are the interests of minority shareholders
protected by the legal system?’ The answer is also based on a Likert scale, with
one suggesting that these are not at all protected, and seven implying
full protection.
We expect a positive relationship between all these indicators of accounting quality
and stock price informativeness. The stronger are the auditing and reporting stand-
ards, the investor protection, the efficacy of corporate boards and the protection of
minority shareholders’ rights, the more firm-specific information incorporates into
the stock prices. The descriptive statistics of the accounting quality variables for each
country from the sample are displayed in Table 1.
3.2. Stock price informativeness
We assess stock price informativeness through the use of two alternative measures:
stock price synchronicity (Wj) and idiosyncratic volatility (logðr2l;jÞ).
We follow Morck et al. (2000) and we estimate annually the two-factor inter-
national model:
ri;j;t ¼ ai;j þ b1;irL;j;t þ b2;irW;t þ li;j;t (1)
where ri;j;t is the weekly return of stock i of country j in week t of a year, rL;j;t is the
weekly market return of country j in week t; and rW;t is the world global market
return in week t: To analyse the relationship between the indicators of accounting
quality and firm-specific information in our sample we use the coefficient of deter-
mination R2 which is a measure of stock price synchronicity. According to Morck
et al. (2000), a lower value of R2 indicates that more firm-specific information is
impounded into the stock price and, this way, the stock price is more informative.
Given the cross-country nature of this analysis, we use an equally weighted average
of the coefficients of determination of the individual stocks in the country j and apply






Morck et al. (2000) show that Wj can be decomposed into market-wide variation
ðlogðr2M;jÞÞ and firm-specific variation (logðr2l;jÞ):
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The variable logðr2l;jÞ is the logarithm of the average explained sum of squares
from Eq. (1). A higher value of logðr2l;jÞ indicates that more firm-specific information
is incorporated into the stock price.
3.3. Data and control variables
This study is conducted on a balanced panel of 18 developed countries during the period
January 2004 – December 2015. We follow the approach of Cheong and Zurbruegg
(2016) and include in the sample only countries that at the date of the analysis have
adopted International Financial Reporting Standards. The reason for selecting only coun-
tries that apply IFRS is to ensure that the accounting standards regime is, as much as
possible, the same across our sample, so that any differences in reporting quality would
be a result of institutional features of the market, independent of the disclosure standards.
Moreover, to maintain the results unaltered by large cross-section differences, we
restricted the sample to developed markets only due to their low synchronicity compared
to emerging markets and low firm-specific and market-wide variations.
The sample includes only constituents of the stock market indexes that were continu-
ously traded during the period of the study, because as Kelly (2014) states, even in the case
of these markets, low-R2 stocks are small, young and covered by few analysts. Weekly equity
prices for each local stock market index and for the world global market index are denomi-
nated in dollars and are extracted from Thomson Reuters Eikon Database. The world global
market index is represented by the MSCI World Index, which is a broad global equity index
that represents large and mid-cap equity performance of 23 developed market countries. It
describes the performance of the world’s stock market and does not offer exposure to
emerging markets. The summary statistics of our sample are displayed in Table 2.
Table 2. Summary statistics of the sample. The R2 and r2l;j are averages of annual measures of
synchronicity and idiosyncratic volatility.
No. Country Stock index Number of stocks R2 r2l;j
1 Australia ASX50 41 0.314 0.00116
2 Austria ATX 18 0.398 0.00149
3 Belgium BEL20 15 0.387 0.00093
4 Canada TSX60 57 0.299 0.00138
5 Denmark OMXC20 16 0.335 0.00133
6 Finland OMXH25 21 0.448 0.00119
7 France CAC40 33 0.484 0.00088
8 Germany DAX 27 0.471 0.00105
9 Hong Kong HIS 44 0.412 0.00137
10 Israel TA35 26 0.311 0.00138
11 Italy FTSE MIB 30 0.460 0.00136
12 Netherlands AEX 19 0.449 0.00095
13 Norway OBX 21 0.367 0.00253
14 Portugal PSI20 15 0.335 0.00122
15 Spain IBEX35 23 0.525 0.00090
16 Sweden OMXS30 28 0.467 0.00099
17 Switzerland SMI 20 0.485 0.00082
18 UK FTSE100 82 0.361 0.00125
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Prior research (Fernandes & Ferreira, 2009; Jin & Myers, 2006; Morck et al.,
2000) suggest that countries’ characteristics have an influence on stock return syn-
chronicity and the incorporation of information into stock prices. To control for
these factors and also for robustness purposes, we include in our paper eight
country-level control variables: diversity; government effectiveness and control of
corruption; GDP per capita; GDP growth volatility; number of stocks; country
size; industry Herfindahl index and firm Herfindahl index. Most of the variables
are extracted from the World Bank Database and Thomson Reuters Eikon
Database, except the Herfindahl indexes, which are determined based on all the
stocks listed on the sample markets.
a. Diversity is constructed following Jin and Myers (2006). This variable represents
the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts of the firm’s earnings in the follow-
ing year, normalised by the mean forecast and divided by the square root of the





b. Government effectiveness and control of corruption (Gov_Corr) is an aggregate
indicator, computed by using the data provided in The Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGI) project. Government effectiveness reflects perceptions of the
quality of public services; the quality of the civil service and the degree of its
independence from political pressures; the quality of policy formulation and
implementation; and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such
policies. Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty cash and grand forms of
corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests (Kraay,
Kaufmann, & Mastruzzi, 2010).
c. GDP per capita. Stock prices in economies with high per capita GDP move in a
relatively unsynchronised manner, while stock prices in low per capita GDP
economies tend to move up or down together. GDP per capita is a measure of
economic development, and by using it, we control for differences between coun-
tries in their economic welfare.
d. GDP growth volatility. The variance of per capita GDP serves to control for
macroeconomic instability.
e. The number of stocks. In a market with few securities, each security is a more
important part of the market index. Thus, higher synchronicity could simply
reflect fewer traded stocks. To control for these effects, we use the logarithm of
the number of listed stocks from each market.
f. Country size. Country size could matter in at least two ways. First, economic
activity in a small country could be geographically localised, so that the nearby
events might have market-wide effects that would not be as evident in a larger
country. Second, Bernstein and Weinstein (2002) observe the economic special-
isation predicted by standard international trade theory across geographical units
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of similar size, but not across countries. This finding implies that larger states
have factor endowments that exhibit less uniformity, which, in turn, suggests that
the stocks in large countries might move more independently than those in small
countries. Consequently, we use the logarithm of geographical size, in square kil-
ometres, for each country, to capture any relation between country size and syn-
chronicity in stock returns.
g. Industry Herfindahl Index and h) Firm Herfindahl Index. Economic specialisation
might appear in the economies where listed firms are concentrated in a few
industries. In consequence, these firms could have highly correlated fundamentals
and highly synchronous stock prices. Undiversified economies should, therefore,
exhibit higher stock price synchronicity than the diversified ones. Alternatively,
some economies may be dominated by a few very large firms. If most other listed
firms are suppliers or customers of these dominant companies, a high degree of
stock price synchronicity could arise. Problems that would be firm-specific in a
larger economy can potentially impact the entire economy.
To control for these economic specialisation effects, we construct an industry
Herfindahl index and a firm Herfindahl index for each country form the sample. We





where hk,j is the combined value of the sales of all country j firms in industry k as a
percentage of those of all country j firms.





where ĥi,j is the sales of firm i as a percentage of the total sales of all country j firms.
High values of the industry and firm Herfindahl indexes imply respectively, a lack
of industry diversity and the dominance of a few large firms. Roll (1988) finds that
high industry or high firm concentration, as captured by Herfindahl indexes, partly
explains the high volatility of some stock market indices.
4. Results and discussion
The OLS estimation results for several regressions in which the endogenous variable
is stock price synchronicity (Wj) are presented in Table 3.
In model (1) the coefficient of investor protection variable is negative and signifi-
cant at the 1% level. This result suggests that stock price synchronicity is lower when
investors are better protected. In other words, stock prices contain more firm-specific
information when investor protection is higher. Model (2) presents a negative coeffi-
cient of the strength of auditing and reporting standards variable which is significant
at the 1% level. This implies that stock price synchronicity is lower when the strength
of auditing and reporting standards is higher. Consequently, auditing and financial
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reporting standards have a strong impact on the incorporation of firm-specific infor-
mation into stock prices. High-quality accounting standards determine more effi-
ciency in the inclusion of firm-specific information into stock prices. In model (3)
the coefficient of the efficacy of corporate boards’ variable is negative and significant
at the 1% level. This result suggests that stock price synchronicity is lower when the
efficacy of corporate boards is higher. The efficacy of corporate boards determines
the amount of firm-specific information that impounds into stock prices. Model (4)
displays the relation between stock price synchronicity and the protection of minority
shareholders’ rights. The coefficient of protection of minority shareholders’ rights
variable is negative and significant at the 1% level. In consequence, when minority
shareholders’ rights are better protected, stock price synchronicity is lower, which
means that more firm-specific information impounds into stock prices.
To synthesise, all the coefficients of the independent variables used as proxies for
accounting quality from the regressions tested below are negative and significant at
the 1% level, meaning that accounting quality has an impact on stock price synchron-
icity and the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices. The better
accounting quality is, the lower is the stock price synchronicity. The better accounting
quality is, the more firm-specific information impounds into stock prices. In model
Table 3. Regression results – dependent variable stock price synchronicity.
Dependent variable
Wj
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Strength of investor protection 0.133
(5.45)
– – – –





Efficacy of corporate boards – – 0.456
(2.66)
– –
Protection of minority sharehoders – – – 0.321
(3.53)
–


















































































Sample volume 207 207 207 207 207
R2 adjusted 0.243 0.178 0.1619 0.1770 0.2478
F 7.86 5.12 4.44 5.26 8.30
Note: In brackets are robust t-statistic values of the regression coefficients. , , and  denote statistical signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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(5) the coefficient of Accountability is negative and significant at the 1% level.
Accountability is the aggregate indicator of financial reporting quality and impounds
the former variables tested before. The result suggests that stock price synchronicity
is lower when accounting quality is higher. In other words, accounting quality deter-
mines the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices, in the way
that along with the improvement of accounting quality also increases the amount of
firm-specific information embedded into stock prices.
Next, we analyse the relationship between accounting quality and idiosyncratic
volatility (Table 4). We predict a positive relationship because we expect the variables
used as proxies for accounting quality to have a direct positive impact on the incorp-
oration of firm-specific information into stock prices. The higher accounting quality
is, the more firm-specific information impounds into stock prices. The results exhibit
that our hypothesis is correct, all the coefficients of the interest variables are positive
and significant at 1% level, with one exception. The coefficient of the efficacy of cor-
porate boards’ variable is positive, but not significant. These results imply that the
higher are the strength of investor protection, the strength of auditing and reporting
standards and the protection of minority shareholders, the more firm-specific infor-
mation is impounded into stock prices. We obtain the same result from the
Table 4. Regression results – dependent variable idiosyncratic volatility.
Dependent variable
logðr2l;jÞ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Strength of investor protection 0.137
(8.64)
– – – –





Efficacy of corporate boards – – 0.195
(1.57)
– –
Protection of minority sharehoders – – – 0.359
(5.44)
–


















































































Sample volume 207 207 207 207 207
R2 adjusted 0.3245 0.1272 0.0804 0.1954 0.2766
F 13 3.60 0.0201 5.49 9.89
Note: In brackets are robust t-statistic values of the regression coefficients. , , and  denote statistical signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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regression containing the aggregate indicator Accountability. The coefficient of the
Accountability variable from the model is positive and significant at 1% level. This
suggests that when accounting quality is at high standards, stock prices contain more
firm-specific information.
The exogenous variable of interest (the strength of investor protection; the strength of
auditing and reporting standards; the efficacy of corporate boards; protection of minority
shareholders’ interests; accountability) does not vary in time, unless in very few cases.
That is why its inclusion in the model is equivalent to the introduction of fixed effects in
cross-section. This is the principal argument for using OLS in order to obtain
the estimators.
Regarding the endogenous variable, we notice there is a pattern that repeats over
time during the Global Crisis, synchronicity and idiosyncratic volatility are much
greater during this period. For this reason, we additionally estimate the model con-
taining the dummy variable for the Global Crisis of 2007-2008. According to
Wooldridge (2012, Chapter 15), for models estimated with OLS, we should often
Table 5. Regression results of the models containing the dummy variable for the Global
Economic Crisis – dependent variable synchronicity.
Dependent variable
Wj
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Strength of investor protection 0.134
(5.57)
– – – –





Efficacy of corporate boards – – 0.582
(3.34)
– –
Protection of minority sharehoders – – – 0.465
(4.66)
–




























































































Sample volume 207 207 207 207 207
R2 adjusted 0.2567 0.2093 0.1899 0.2244 0.3116
F 8.44 5.75 5.25 6.38 9.60
Note: In brackets are robust t-statistic values of the regression coefficients. , , and  denote statistical signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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include time period dummy variables to allow for aggregate time effects. These
dummy variables are exogenous and they act as their own instruments. Tables 5
and 6 display the results of this model, depending on the endogenous variable. These
estimations also check the robustness of our core findings.
The coefficients of all the variables of interest are significant at 1% level, with one
exception. The coefficient of the efficacy of corporate boards is not significant in rela-
tion to idiosyncratic volatility. In Table 5 the dependent variable is stock price syn-
chronicity. In this case, all the models tested exhibit negative coefficients of the
variables used as proxies for accounting quality. Consequently, our initial results are
sustained as we find a negative relation between accounting quality and stock price
synchronicity. Moreover, we notice that the dummy variable has positive coefficients
significant at 1% level. Therefore, we can state that the Global Economic Crisis had a
strong impact upon stock price synchronicity. The stock prices move together more
during the Global Crisis, the firm-specific information being impounded into stock
prices slower.
Table 6. Regression results of the models containing the dummy variable for the Global
Economic Crisis – dependent variable idiosyncratic volatility.
Dependent variable
logðr2l;jÞ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Strength of investor protection 0.136
(8.66)
– – – –





Efficacy of corporate boards – – 0.127
(1.00)
– –
Protection of minority sharehoders – – – 0.353
(4.78)
–




























































































Sample volume 207 207 207 207 207
R2 adjusted 0.3461 0.1362 0.0975 0.1956 0.2767
F 12.65 3.68 2.70 5.14 8.94
Note: In brackets are robust t-statistic values of the regression coefficients. , , and  denote statistical signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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Table 6 contains the results of the models in which idiosyncratic volatility is the
endogenous variable. In these cases, all the coefficients of the variables of interest are
positive. The coefficients of all the variables of interest are significant at 1% level,
with one exception: the coefficient of the efficacy of corporate boards, which is not
significant. These results suggest that there is a direct positive relationship between
accounting quality and idiosyncratic volatility even under the effects of the Global
Crisis. When accounting quality is at high levels, the degree of firm-specific informa-
tion impounded into stock prices is greater. As for the dummy variable for the
Global Crisis, the results are mixed. The coefficients of the dummy variable appear to
be significant only in the first three models, at different levels of significance. When
testing the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and Accountability, the coeffi-
cient of the dummy variable is not significant, meaning that, in this case, the Global
Crisis does not impact the incorporation of firm-specific information into
stock prices.
5. Conclusions
This paper extends the empirical literature on financial reporting quality by exploring its
relationship to stock-price informativeness. Our proxies for financial accounting quality
are the strength of auditing and reporting standards; the strength of investor protection;
the efficacy of corporate boards; and the protection of minority shareholders’ interests.
We also use Accountability as an aggregate indicator of accounting quality. We use stock
price synchronicity and idiosyncratic volatility as proxies for stock price informativeness.
Using data from 18 developed national stock markets, our results show robust evi-
dence supporting the hypothesis that financial reporting quality influences the co-
movements of the shares listed on the capital market and the incorporation of firm-
specific information into stock prices. The higher is the accounting quality, the more
firm-specific information can be found in the stock prices. The higher is the account-
ing quality, the lower is stock price synchronicity.
The existence and direction of causality between financial reporting quality and
stock price informativeness have implications for several users of financial informa-
tion, as policy setters and the management of the companies. The policy setters may
learn from the effects of the accounting quality on the stock market and thus make
efforts for applying and maintaining International Financial Reporting Standards and
International Auditing Standards, as these standards assure a certain level of reporting
quality in a country. The real effects of financial markets determine the management
to pay great attention to the movements from the capital markets and to learn from
the stock prices. The new information they obtain from stock prices can be used in
their decision-making process and could guide their actions.
The fact that financial markets have a real effect through the transmission of infor-
mation does not imply that real-decision makers are less informed that traders, but
only that they do not have perfect information about every decision-relevant factor.
This information can be in possession of outsiders. Thus, real-decision makers, such
as the management teams, may be the most informed agents in the economy about
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the firm, but there are still aspects about which they can learn from the outsiders
(Bond et al., 2012).
We have included in our sample only developed countries, but the tested relation-
ships are obviously an empirical question also on the emerging markets. We leave




Armstrong, C. S., Barth, M. E., Jagolinzer, A. D., & Riedl, E. J. (2010). Market reaction to the
adoption of IFRS in Europe. The Accounting Review, 85(1), 31–61. doi:10.2308/accr.2010.85.
1.31
Ball, R. (2006). International financial reporting standards (IFRS): Pros and cons for investors.
Accounting and Business Research, 36(sup1), 5–27. doi:10.1080/00014788.2006.9730040
Ball, R., Kothari, S. P., & Robin, A. (2000). The effect of institutional factors on properties of
accounting earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29(1), 1–51. doi:10.1016/S0165-
4101(00)00012-4
Ball, R., Robin, A., & Wu, J. S. (2003). Incentives versus standards: Properties of accounting
income in four East Asian countries. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1–3),
235–270. doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.10.003
Barth, M. E., Landsman, W. R., & Lang, M. H. (2008). International accounting standards and
accounting quality. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(3), 432–467. doi:10.1111/j.1475-679X.
2008.00287.x
Bernstein, J. R., & Weinstein, D. E. (2002). Do endowments predict the location of produc-
tion? Evidence from national and international data. Journal of International Economics,
56(1), 55–76.
Bhattacharya, U., Daouk, H., & Welker, M. (2003). The world price of earnings opacity. The
Accounting Review, 78(3), 641–678. doi:10.2308/accr.2003.78.3.641
Bond, P., Edmans, A., & Goldstein, I. (2012). The real effects of financial markets. Annual
Review of Financial Economics, 4(1), 339–360. doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-110311-101826
Boolaky, P. K. (2012). Auditing and reporting in Europe: An analysis using country-level data.
Managerial Auditing Journal, 27(1), 41–65.
Boolaky, P. K., & Cooper, B. J. (2015). Comparing the strength of auditing and reporting
standards and investigating their predictors in Europe and Asia. Australian Accounting
Review, 25(3), 292–308. doi:10.1111/auar.12058
Boolaky, P., Krishnamurti, C., & Hogue, A. (2013). Determinants of the strength of auditing
and reporting standards: A cross-country study. Australasian Accounting, Business and
Finance Journal, 7(4), 17–36. doi:10.14453/aabfj.v7i4.3
Bushman, R. M., Piotroski, J. D., & Smith, A. J. (2004). What determine corporate transpar-
ency? Journal of Accounting Research, 42(2), 207–252. doi:10.1111/j.1475-679X.2004.00136.x
Chen, H., Tang, Q., Jiang, Y., & Lin, Z. (2010). The role of international financial reporting
standards in accounting quality: Evidence from the European Union. Journal of
International Financial Management & Accounting, 21, 220–278. doi:10.1111/j.1467-646X.
2010.01041.x
Cheng, E. C. M., & Courtenay, S. M. (2006). Board composition, regulatory regime and volun-
tary disclosure. The International Journal of Accounting, 41(3), 262–289. doi:10.1016/j.intacc.
2006.07.001
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA 2497
Cheong, C. S., & Zurbruegg, R. (2016). Analyst forecasts and stock price informativeness:
Some international evidence on the role of audit quality. Journal of Contemporary
Accounting & Economics, 12(3), 257–273. doi:10.1016/j.jcae.2016.09.002
Covrig, V. M., Defond, M. L., & Hung, M. (2007). Home bias, foreign mutual fund holdings,
and the voluntary adoption of international accounting standards. Journal of Accounting
Research, 45(1), 41–70. doi:10.1111/j.1475-679X.2007.00226.x
Dahya, J., Dimitrov, O., & McConnell, J. (2008). Dominant shareholders, corporate boards,
and corporate value: A cross-country analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 87(1),
73–100. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.10.005
Daske, H., Hail, L., Leuz, C., & Verdi, R. S. (2008). Mandatory IFRS reporting around the
world: Early evidence on the economic consequences. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(5),
1085–1142. doi:10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00306.x
Davis-Friday, P. Y. (2010). Discussion of ‘financial reporting quality in international settings:
A comparative study of the U.S.A, Japan, Thailand, France and Germany. The International
Journal of Accounting, 45(1), 35–38. doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2010.01.002
Doryie, E. J. (2012). Corporate governance and stock price synchronicity (PhD thesis).
University of Leeds, Leeds, West Yorkshire, England.
Durnev, A., Morck, R., Yeung, B., & Zarowin, P. (2003). Does greater firm-specific return vari-
ation mean more or less informed stock pricing? Journal of Accounting Research, 41(5),
797–836. doi:10.1046/j.1475-679X.2003.00124.x
Fama, E., & Miller, M. (1972). The theory of finance. New York: Dryden Press.
Fernandes, N., & Ferreira, M. A. (2009). Insider trading laws and stock price informativeness.
Review of Financial Studies, 22(5), 1845–1887. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn066
Francis, J. R., & Wang, D. (2008). The joint effect of investor protection and big 4 audits on
earnings quality around the world. Contemporary Accounting Research, 25(1), 157–191. doi:
10.1506/car.25.1.6
Haw, I., Hu, B., Lee, J., & Wu, W. (2012). The investor protection and price informativeness
about future earnings: International evidence. Review of Accounting Studies, 17(2), 389–419.
doi:10.1007/s11142-012-9181-z
Hayek, F. (1945). The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review, 35(4), 519–530.
Houqe, M. N., van Zijl, T., Dunstan, K., & Karim, A. K. M. (2012). The effect of IFRS adop-
tion and investor protection on earnings quality around the world. The International
Journal of Accounting, 47(3), 333–355. doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2012.07.003
Jin, L., & Myers, S. C. (2006). R2 around the world: New theory and new tests. Journal of
Financial Economics, 79(2), 257–292. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.11.003
Kelly, P. J. (2014). Information efficiency and firm-specific return variation. Quarterly Journal
of Finance, 04(04), 1450018. doi:10.1142/S2010139214500189
Kraay, A., Kaufmann, D., & Mastruzzi, M. (2010). The worldwide governance indicators:
Methodology and analytical issues. (Policy Research Working Paper No. WPS 5430). World
Bank.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2000). Agency problems and
dividend policies around the World. The Journal of Finance, 55(1), 1–33. doi:10.1111/0022-
1082.00199
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and finance.
Journal of Political Economy, 16(6), 1113–1155. doi:10.1086/250042
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). Legal determinants of
external finance. The Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1131–1150. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.
tb02727.x
Leuz, C., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. D. (2003). Earnings management and investor protection:
An international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics, 69(3), 505–527. doi:10.1016/
S0304-405X(03)00121-1
Li, B., Rajgopal, S., & Venkatachalam, M. (2014). R2 and Idiosyncratic Risk Are Not
Interchangeable. The Accounting Review, 89(6), 2261–2295. doi:10.2308/accr-50826
2498 A. TIRON-TUDOR AND A. M. ACHIM (NASCA)
Morck, R., Yeung, B., & Yu, W. (2000). The information content of stock markets: Why do
emerging markets have synchronous stock price movements? Journal of Financial
Economics, 58(1-2), 215–260. doi:10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00071-4
Nurunnabi, M. (2017). Does cultural value affect board efficacy? Insights on international cor-
porate governance. International Journal of Law and Management, 59(6), 1257–1268. doi:10.
1108/IJLMA-09-2016-0081
Roll, R. (1988). R2. The Journal of Finance, 43, 541–566. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04591.
x
Soderstrom, N. S., & Sun, K. J. (2007). IFRS adoption and accounting quality: A review.
European Accounting Review, 16(4), 675–702. doi:10.1080/09638180701706732
Todea, A., & Buglea, A. M. (2017). Individualism and stock price reaction to market-wide
information. Economics Letters, 160, 4–6. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.028
Uyar, A., Gungormus, A. H., & Kuzey, C. (2017). Impact of the accounting information system
on corporate governance: Evidence from Turkish non-listed companies. Australasian
Accounting, Business and Finance Journal, 11(1), 9–27. doi:10.14453/aabfj.v11i1.3
Wooldridge, J. M. (2012). Introductory econometrics. A modern approach (5th ed.). USA:
South-Western CENGAGE Learning.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA 2499
